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STUDENT COMMENTS
PREVENTING MALPRACTICE: PROFESSIONAL
SELF-REGULATION AND THE QUALITY OF CARE
IN ANESTHESIOLOGY
JAMES K. SCHEPERS*
INTRODUCTION
Recent discussions of medical cost containment focus pri-
marily on ways to reduce rapidly-spiralling medical costs. In
seeking methods to control medical costs, however, few dis-
cussions recognize that the high cost of medical care also re-
flects the high cost of medical error. The costs of compensat-
ing an injured patient or the patient's family are manifested
in malpractice insurance premiums and ultimately passed on
to the consumer. While some medical mishaps may not be
preventable, reducing the amount of malpractice should help
limit medical costs. In addition to other measures to contain
medical costs, the fundamental problem of professional self-
regulation must be addressed, that of simply reducing the in-
cidence of malpractice.
This article discusses professional self-regulation within
the medical profession and within the specialty of anesthesiol-
ogy.1 Recent studies of anesthetic mishaps show a need for
* B.A. 1983, Calvin College; M.A. 1984, University of Michigan; J.D.
1988, University of Notre Dame 1988; Thos. J. White Scholar 1986-1988.
1. Anesthesiology is defined by the American Association of Anesthe-
siologists as a discipline within the practice of medicine specializing in:
A. The medical management of patients who are rendered un-
conscious and/or insensible to pain and emotional stress
during surgical, obstetrical and certain other medical proce-
dures (involves preoperative, intraoperative and postopera-
tive evaluation and treatment of these patients);
B. The protection of life functions and vital organs (e.g. brain,
heart, lungs, kidneys, liver) under the stress of anesthetic,
surgical and other medical procedures;
C. The management of problems in pain relief;
D. The management of cardiopulmonary resuscitation;
E. The management of problems in pulmonary care;
F. The management of critically ill patients in special care
units.
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increased professional self-regulation within this specialty. Af-
ter outlining current methods of professional self-regulation,
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and the
Harvard Medical School standards for anesthesia monitoring
are reviewed. Using anesthesiology as an example of the
larger profession, the tension between controlling medical
costs and improving the quality of care is then explored. In
considering ethical implications of professional self-regulation
and anesthesiology practice, it is concluded that providing an
acceptable level of care should not be sacrificed for personal
gain, efficiency, or cost containment.
I. THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION IN
ANESTHESIOLOGY
The vast majority of general anesthetics administered in
the nation's hospitals are safe and uneventful. Nevertheless,
despite advanced anesthetic drugs, complex monitoring
equipment, and extensive training of anesthetists and anes-
thesiologists, anesthetic mishaps still occur.' A study by physi-
2. In July 1978, seven-year old Gene Schneider underwent surgery in
Lansing, Michigan for a tonsillectomy and bilateral tympanotomy, a minor
ear operation. [A tympanotomy is defined as a surgical puncture of the
tympanic membrane to reduce pressure in the middle ear. See DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1414 (26th ed. 1985).] A nurse-anesthe-
tist provided anesthesia under the supervision of her employer, an anesthe-
siologist. [A nurse-anesthetist or anesthetist is a registered nurse with addi-
tional training in anesthesia. Depending on variations in nurse's training
and anesthesia training, an anesthetist may have from two and one-half
years to six years of training. An anesthesiologist is a physician with special-
ized training in anesthesia. A five-year residency in anesthesia is completed
following four years of college and an additional four years of medical
school.] During surgery the child suffered a cardiac arrest; although he was
resuscitated, the child never regained consciousness. Six days later, after a
test failed to reveal brain wave activity, he was taken off the respirator.
The pathologist determined anesthesia caused the child's death. The
child's parents sued the anesthetist, anesthesiologist, and hospital claiming
several acts of malpractice including anesthetic overdose, inadequate moni-
toring, and failure to follow adequate standards for the administration of
anesthesia. The nurse-anesthetist and anesthesiologist settled the claim
before trial for $257,739. The trial court returned a verdict against the
hospital for $742,000., which on appeal was reversed and remanded. The-
ophelis v. Lansing General Hosp., 366 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. App. 1985), va-
cated 384 N.W.2d 823 (Mich. App. 1986). The case is currently being re-
viewed by the Michigan Supreme Court. 426 Mich. 863 No. 78166 (Oct.
22, 1986).
In September 1981, Mrs. Brenda Worthy gave birth without anesthesia
and underwent surgery the following day for tubal ligation. Central Anes-
thesia Associates, P.C., (CAA) a group of eight anesthesiologists, provided
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cians from the Harvard Medical School Department of Anes-
thesia recognized that "[a]mong the approximately 20
million patients anesthetized annually in the United States,
2000 or more may die of causes primarily attributable to an-
esthesia."' Another study estimated the anesthesia-related
mortality rate to lie in the range of 1 per 4,000 to 1 per
10,000 patients, resulting in 2,000 to 5,000 deaths annually.'
An analysis of claims for death or brain damage related to
anesthesia in the United Kingdom produced nearly identical
conclusions. From a five-year study of one-third of all hospi-
tals in Great Britain, anesthesia mishaps were the sole cause
of death in 1 of 10,000 patients, and may have contributed to
the deaths of 1 of 1,700.1
The anesthesia-related death of only one patient in four
thousand or of only one patient in ten thousand administra-
tions might be dismissed as a marginal level of error, a re-
grettable but unavoidable transaction cost. Because every ad-
ministration of general anesthesia is inherently dangerous, a
certain percentage of mishaps is statistically foreseeable. An
adverse reaction to anesthesia, for example, cannot be clini-
cally predicted or prevented. The intrinsic risk of administra-
tion, however, fails to account for current mortality rates. Of
the two thousand to five thousand annual deaths attributable
anesthesia. Ms. Castro, a student nurse enrolled at the anesthesia school
operated by CAA, administered the anesthesia but was not supervised by
an anesthetist or anesthesiologist, a violation of state law. Central Anesthe-
sia Associates P.C. v. Worthy, 325 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. App. 1984), affd, 333
S.E.2d 829 (Ga. App. 1985).
Allegedly as the result of improper anesthesia procedures, Mrs. Worthy
suffered a cardiac arrest and subsequent brain damage. Mrs. Worthy re-
mains comatose.
Each of the CAA anesthesiologists at the hospital during Mrs. Worthy's
surgery denied responsibility for her care. The surgery took place in an
operating room on the seventh floor of the hospital; the only CAA anes-
thesiologist responding to an emergency alarm came from his office on the
second floor. The trial court ruled the administration of anesthesia by
CAA was negligent as a matter of law and reserved issues of causation and
damages for a jury. This determination was upheld by both the Court of
Appeals of Georgia and the Georgia Supreme Court.
3. Eichhorn, Cooper, Cullen, Maier, Philip, and Seeman, Standards
for Patient Monitoring During Anesthesia at Harvard Medical School, 256
JAMMED.A. 1017 (1986) [hereinafter Harvard Anesthesia Standards].
4. Pierce, Historical Perspectives, in ANALYSIS OF ANESTHETIC MISHAPS.
INTERNATIONAL ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS 1-16 (Pierce and Cooper, eds.
1982).
5. Green and Taylor, An Analysis of Anesthesia Medical Liability Claims
in the United Kingdom, in ANALYSIS OF ANESTHETIC MISHAPS. INTERNATIONAL
ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS 74 (Pierce and Cooper, eds. 1982).
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to anesthesia,' the Harvard study concluded "[t]he majority
of these deaths are thought to be preventable."' Again, the
study of anesthesia-related deaths in Great Britain supports
this finding. In using higher figures of anesthesia-related mis-
haps, one death in ten thousand patients, the authors con-
clude the primary cause for seventy percent of the anesthesia-
related deaths was an error of judgment by the anesthetist.8
Studies of insurance claims support these findings of a
significant amount of human error during administration of
general anesthesia.9 A review of 1,500 major claims submit-
ted to the St. Paul Companies for the years 1976 to 1978
identified 308 claims relating to anesthesia. While the au-
thors realized some of these mishaps likely resulted from un-
foreseeable adverse reactions to the anesthetic agents, they
contended "more obvious and logical causes of misadventure
usually surfaced, most commonly in the form of human er-
rors, failure to cope with acute yet common situations, and
lapses in vigilance of otherwise competent individuals." 1
They concluded, "[i]n a reconstruction of the events leading
to these claims, there is clear evidence of a relaxing of the
vigilance once regarded as the hallmark of the competent an-
esthetist. In some cases, we question that this vigilance had
ever been acquired."1
To reduce the incidence of anesthetic mishaps in its uni-
versity hospitals, the physicians from the Harvard Depart-
ment of Anaesthesia recently formulated mandatory stan-
dards for the administration of anesthesia. 2 The professional
association for nurse-anesthetists, the American Association
of Nurse Anesthetists (AANA) has formally endorsed these
6. Pierce, Risk Modification in Anesthesiology, 1 ANESTHESIA PATIENT
SAFETY FOUND. NEWSL. 25 (1986) [hereinafter Pierce, Risk Modification].
7. Harvard Anesthesia Standards, supra note 3, at 1017.
8. Green, supra note 5, at 74.
9. Davis, An Analysis of Anesthetic Mishaps from Medical Liability
Claims, in ANALYSIS OF ANESTHETIC MISHAPS. INTERNATIONAL ANESTHESIOL-
OGY CLINICS 31 (Pierce and Cooper, eds. 1984).
10. Id. at 38. Another study of insurance claims from the St. Paul
Company illustrates the extremely high cost of anesthetic mishaps. Twenty-
three percent of anesthesia claims from 1981 to 1985 from the St. Paul
Company were for cardiac arrest and other catastrophic claims. The aver-
age cost for each of these 273 claims was $131,459. Of course, this cost is
passed on to anesthesiologists and to the public. See Wood, Anesthesia
Claims Decrease, 1 ANESTHESIA PATIENT SAFETY FOUND. NEWSL. 21, 23
(1986).
11. Davis, supra note 9, at 40, 41.
12. Harvard Anesthesia Standards, supra note 3, at 1017.
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standards."3 The Harvard study addresses several issues con-
cerning the administration of anesthesia and professional self-
regulation. On a technical level, the physicians have postu-
lated seven standards for minimal patient monitoring during
anesthesia.' 4 If followed diligently, the standards may help re-
duce the amount of malpractice in anesthesiology. While em-
phasizing the need for more effective professional self-regula-
tion, the study overlooks several troubling issues: whether by
its very nature professional self-regulation can be truly effec-
tive, and whether mandatory standards can improve profes-
sional self-regulation and reduce the amount of human error
in anesthesiology.
II. CURRENT METHODS OF SELF-REGULATION
In establishing standards to reduce the incidence of
human error within anesthesiology, the Harvard physicians
acknowledge the weakness of current methods of professional
self-regulation. Regulation of the medical profession is
achieved through several levels of formal disciplinary mecha-
nisms, such as state medical boards and hospital regulations.
Informal disciplinary measures among physicians, such as so-
cial stigmatism, may in some cases provide additional profes-
sional controls.
A. Formal Medical Regulation
State medical boards are the primary formal mechanism
to ensure competency and to discipline members of the pro-
fession. Physician competency is determined by examining
and licensing medical school graduates, renewing licenses to
practice, and requiring continuing medical education.'" For-
mal self-discipline is achieved through disciplinary hearings
conducted by the state medical boards. An investigation and
hearing are typically initiated after a complaint alleges a vio-
lation of the state licensing statute, such as "unprofessional
conduct," "professional incompetence," unethical business
practices, or substance abuse. 6 Sanctions range in severity
13. AANA Board endorses Harvard Anesthesia Standards for Monitoring
Patients and FDA Check-out Procedure for Anesthesia Apparatus, AANA NEws
BULL., Dec. 1986, at 1.
14. The Harvard Anesthesia Standards, supra note 3, are set forth in
Appendix A.
15. S. GROSS, OF FoxES AND HEN HOUSES: LICENSING AND THE HEALTH
PROFESSIONS (1984) at 83.
16. J. PETERS, K. FINEBERG, D. KROLL, AND V. COLLINS, ANESTHESIOLOGY
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from censure of the physician to revocation of the license to
practice. According to the Federation of State Medical
Boards, in 1986 state medical boards across the country re-
voked the licenses of 458 practitioners, placed the licenses of
528 practitioners on probation, suspended the licenses of 335
practitioners, and undertook 981 "other regulatory actions"
including license limitations or denials, reprimands, or ad-
monishments. 17 The 1986 total of 2,302 formal disciplinary
actions marked an increase of 9.2 percent over the official
1985 total of 2,108 disciplinary actions.18 In 1985 state medi-
cal boards revoked the licenses of 406 practitioners, placed
the licenses of 491 practitioners on probation, suspended the
licenses of 235 practitioners, and undertook 976 "other regu-
latory actions" as defined above.19 The 1985 total of 2,108
formal disciplinary actions represented a 37 percent increase
over the 1,540 actions taken by state medical boards in
1984." According to the American Medical Association,
there were 528,000 practicing physicians in the U.S. in
1985.21 Although state medical boards report differing rates
of physician discipline, 2 the national average in 1985 was 3.9
reported disciplinary actions per 1,000 physicians.
To complement the disciplinary action exercised by re-
spective state medical boards, comprehensive hospital regula-
tions provide several additional levels of review for those
physicians affiliated with a hospital.23 Hospitals generally have
AND THE LAW (1983) at 142 [hereinafter Peters].
17. Galusha and Breaden, Official 1986 Federation Summary of Reported
Disciplinary Actions, 75 FEDERATION BULL. 46 (1988).
18. Id. at 42.
19. Breaden and Galusha, Official 1985 Federation Summary of Reported
Disciplinary Actions, 73 FEDERATION BULL. 300 (1986).
20. Id. at 301. The 1984 statistics are as follows: according to the
Federation of State Medical Boards, in 1984 state medical boards across
the country revoked the licenses of 302 practitioners, placed the licenses of
296 practitioners on probation, suspended the licenses of 190 practitioners,
and undertook 752 "other regulatory actions." Letter from Dale G.
Breaden to James Schepers (Oct. 2, 1986).
21. Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S., AM. MED. A.
(1986).
22. According to the Public Citizen Health Research Group, state
rates of "serious medical disciplinary action" including license revocations,
suspensions, and probations in 1983 ranged from 5.2 actions per 1,000
physicians to no disciplinary actions taken in nine states. See Doctor Disci-
pline: A Necessary Cure for the Malpractice Crisis, Health Letter, PUB. CITIZEN
HEALTH RES. GROUP, Nov./Dec. 1985 at 8.
23. The only formal disciplinary controls over physicians in private
practice is provided by the state medical boards. Because this paper deals
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instituted a system of in-house peer review, in which col-
leagues review each others performance on a regular basis
and offer suggestions and criticisms. Because each hospital
faces liability for the actions of its affiliated physicians and
patient care, the hospital administration is expected to scruti-
nize each physician's performance when hospital privileges
are annually renewed. 4
Hospitals may choose to meet standards of accreditation
promulgated by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation
of Hospitals (JCAH).25 Hospitals have strong incentives to
comply with JCAH standards, for accreditation ensures eligi-
bility for federal reimbursement funds.26 The JCAH stan-
dards for anesthesiology outline education and staffing re-
quirements, procedures for the delivery of anesthesia, and
requirements for quarterly review of the quality of anesthesia
services.27
Federal regulation of hospitals, and by implication, of
physicians, has been achieved through the use of Professional
Review Organizations (PROs), as part of a 1972 amendment
to the Social Security Act." The PRO program was estab-
lished to control both the cost and quality of medical care
funded by the federal government. These goals are accom-
plished through a system of peer review. The admission and
continued care of each patient under a federal reimburse-
ment program is reviewed by a non-physician coordinator, in
consultation with a physician advisor. If the admitting physi-
cian cannot justify the admission or services given to the pa-
tient, funding is terminated. The quality of care provided pa-
tients is also reviewed by analysts and physicians examining
the medical records of patients. If patient care does not meet
the criteria for care developed by the national PROs,
problems and proposed solutions are directed to the hospital
administrator and board of trustees.2 9
The various levels of formal self-discipline provided by
state medical boards and hospitals are subject to inherent
with professional self-regulation and the ethical implications regarding gen-
eral anesthesia, which is normally administered in the hospital setting, the
difficulties of disciplining the physician not affiliated with a hospital are not
addressed.
24. Peters, supra note 16, at 204.
25. Id. at 212.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 214-217.
28. Id. at 157.
29. Id. at 157-163.
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weaknesses. One difficulty with formal self-discipline derives
from the training and organization of the medical profession.
Because clinical experience places primacy on personal expe-
rience and each practitioner's evaluation, physicians face a
fundamental problem when dealing with self-regulation."
Review of another physician's practices is often viewed as a
"direct conflict with the individual physician's control of the
care of his individual patient."'" Any attempt to control the
quality of care provided by a physician tends to be seen as "a
punitive measure threatening their [each physician's] profes-
sional standing and dignity."82
This professional disdain for review is compounded by
other functional weaknesses of the state medical boards. Al-
though state medical boards should emphasize both initial
and continuing physician competency, the lack of funding
and investigative staff limits medical board review. In most
states, the licensing and renewal fees collected by the medical
board are turned over to the state, and the state then deter-
mines the appropriate amount of funding."' Once initial com-
petency is achieved, few methods are available to insure the
maintenance of the original proficiency. Mandatory contin-
ued medical education as a condition of re-certification might
promote expertise, but there is little evidence that such
courses will correct improper practices. In addition, the re-
quirements for continuing medical education are easily met
or simply evaded by practitioners. 4
The lack of effective sanctions also hampers disciplinary
boards. Although the state medical boards have a wide vari-
ety of sanctions at their disposal, the range of severity of
these sanctions and the protection they offer to the public is
skewed. While professional censure or admonishment may
provide the necessary impetus for a practitioner to correct
his conduct, these minor sanctions are generally not revealed
30. E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY
OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE (1970) at 366 [hereinafter Friedson].
31. R. MCCLEERY, ONE LIFE - ONE PHYSICIAN: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION'S PERFORMANCE IN SELF-REGULATION 12 (1971).
32. Id.
33. Peters, supra note 16, at 144.
34. Interview with Kraft Ritter, M.D., practicing anesthesiologist, in
South Bend, IN (Sept. 24, 1986). (Continuing Medical Education is most
often presented in the daily or weekly seminar setting; while each partici-
pant must sign in at the presentation to document his or her presence,
there is no method of insuring their attendance beyond the roll call, much
less insuring the participant's attentiveness.)
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to the public, so there is very little external pressure to con-
form to professional norms. Just as censure may be exces-
sively mild, limitation or revocation of a physicians's license
to practice may be an extremely harsh sanction. This lack of
intermediate sanctions reinforces the view of sanctions as pu-
nitive rather than rehabilitative. Providing mediocre physi-
cians incentives for improvement may be more effective than
either admonishment or the threat of severe punishment.
B. Informal Medical Regulation
A second area of self-regulation often overlooked within
the profession is founded on social controls rather than gov-
ernmental regulation. While informal discipline may be ex-
tremely effective because of its personal nature, this individ-
ual aspect renders its use equally problematic.
For a variety of reasons many physicians are reluctant to
resort to formal disciplinary proceedings. A physician may
lack certainty of another's incompetency or may follow the
adage "but for the grace of God, there go I." Rather than
relying on formal controls, physicians may resort to informal
measures characterized as "talkings-to." 5 If unsolicited peer
advice fails, adverse social and economic sanctions might be
used. Such devices include refusing to ask a physician for ad-
vice, avoiding the colleague, refusing to refer patients to an-
other, and failing to arrange for cross-coverage with the phy-
sician in question. 6 The same measures used to chastise a
physician suspected of incompetency, however, can be used
to discourage a reporting physician. A physician instituting
disciplinary proceedings may endanger the trust and respect
of peers, thus risking social and economic sanctions similar to
those directed against unfit colleagues. While informal disci-
plinary controls can be powerful, there is no method to con-
trol their application, whether justified or not.
The shortcomings inherent in the system of informal
control have been described as problems of observability, lev-
erage, and norms." Cases of gross malpractice are not usually
observed firsthand, but knowledge of incompetency is devel-
oped from a series of incidents and related inferences. Al-
though several peers may harbor suspicions about the offend-
ing physician, these beliefs must coalesce to form a collective
35. Friedson, supra note 30, at 149.
36. Id. at 151.
37. Id. at 152.
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judgment. Because the system of social controls lacks formal
procedure, reaching this "critical mass of discontent" may
take considerable time."
Just as the slow process of reaching consensus hampers
social controls, problems of leverage or credibility also limit
its effectiveness. The opinion of one conscientious physician
may be discounted by peers and dismissed by the offending
physician. When several physicians share a belief, their opin-
ion may gain sufficient weight to influence a colleague. More-
over, for a collective judgment to have any effect, the offend-
ing colleague must be susceptible to the weight of opinion. If
the incompetent physician does not value his professional
standing or the opinion of the professional community, well-
meaning pleas from colleagues fail. "They [personal sanctions]
punish him only insofar as he is sensitive to the good opinion of
those particular individuals who exclude him." 9 (emphasis in
original)
Physicians may also be reluctant to initiate disciplinary
actions against a peer for fear of litigation. An Oregon physi-
cian subjected to an array of informal controls and to formal
hearings by the state medical board retaliated by suing his
reviewing colleagues for anti-trust violations.4 Dr. Timothy
Patrick worked one year with the Astoria Medical Clinic, a
group of eleven local physicians, before establishing an inde-
pendent practice in the area. Clinic physicians failed to give
referrals or consultations to Patrick, refused to enter cross-
coverage agreements, and accused Patrick of stealing clinic
patients.41 Patrick and Clinic physicians were also engaged in
peer-review proceedings at the local hospital. When the hos-
pital began proceedings to terminate Patrick's privileges, at
the urging of a Clinic physician, Patrick resigned from the
hospital.
As part of this long-standing dispute, Patrick filed suit in
1981 against the Clinic physicians under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. In 1984 the case resulted in a $2.2 million judg-
ment against the Clinic physicians for anti-trust violations.4
This judgment was reversed in 1986. The Supreme Court re-
cently granted a petition for writ of certiorari in Patrick to
38. Id. at 148.
39. Id. at 151.
40. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
108 S.Ct. 65, 98 L.Ed.2d 29 (1987).
41. Id. at 1502.
42. Id. at 1505.
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review the state-action doctrine as it applies to peer review
systems.4
In addition to demonstrating several weaknesses and the
conflicts of interest inherent in professional self-regulation,
Patrick carries a much greater significance because of its po-
tential chilling effect on peer review. Physicians are expected
to regulate their profession because other members of society
lack the requisite knowledge and expertise. If physicians are
unwilling to engage in stringent peer review because of possi-
ble retaliatory litigation, the medical profession, including an-
esthesiology, must either accept outside sources of control or
devise alternative methods of professional self-regulation.
III. IMPROVING PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION
Medical costs could be contained and the quality of care
improved by seeking methods to reduce the incidence of mal-
practice. Within the profession as a whole, the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986"' ("Act") strengthens cur-
rent means of state and hospital peer review. By improving
the effectiveness of professional self-regulation, this law
should help reduce the amount of malpractice. Within the
specialty of anesthesiology, the Harvard Medical School stan-
dards for continuous monitoring are designed to reduce
human error by raising the minimum level of patient care.
A. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
By encouraging professional self-regulation, Title IV of
the Act is a significant effort to help reduce the amount of
malpractice. Title IV addresses malpractice in two ways: it
protects professional review activities by physicians and
health care entities by a grant of limited immunity, and it re-
quires reviewing boards and hospitals to report all discipli-
nary actions to state medical boards and to a national
database.
In many respects, the Act may be seen as a response to
issues raised in Patrick.5 To promote effective peer review by
state medical boards and hospital review committees, the Act
43. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 65, 98 L.Ed.2d at 29.
44. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
11101, 11111-11115, 11131-11137, 11151-11152 (West, 1987 Pamphlet)
[hereinafter Health Act of 1986].
45. Patrick, supra note 40.
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grants immunity to participants in the reviewing process. 4 , So
long as information is not known to be false, persons provid-
ing information to the reviewing body are protected from
civil liability.47 Members of the reviewing board, in turn, are
protected from liability for damages if the professional re-
view activity48 meets requirements for good faith, 9 due pro-
cess,50 and reporting.51
To meet the good faith requirements of the Act, review
must be conducted with a reasonable belief it will insure qual-
ity care.62 Due process requirements increase the fairness of
any review proceedings. A physician facing professional re-
view must be accorded the following rights to meet due pro-
cess: to notice of the review, to a hearing held before a per-
son not in direct competition with the physician, to legal
representation, to call witnesses, and to receive written copies
of the proceedings and the decision. 3
The Act also conditions immunity from liability on ex-
tensive reporting requirements. Professional review boards,
as well as insurance carriers, are required to report informa-
tion about adverse decisions and medical malpractice claims
to the State Board of Medical Examiners." Hospitals must
report staff review actions that involve the surrender or sus-
pension of clinical privileges for 30 days or more.55 Other
professional review actions affecting membership in a profes-
sional society, such as censure or the revocation of the physi-
cian's license, must also be reported. 5 Insurance carriers
must also report all payments and settlements deriving from
malpractice coverage, including the physician's name, the
amount of payment, name of any affiliated hospital, and a
description of the claim.57 Insurance carriers failing to pro-
vide this information could be fined up to $10,000.5 8 The
46. Health Act of 1986, supra at note 44, § 11111.
47. Id. at § 11112.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 11134.
52. Id. at § 11112.
53. Id.
54. Id. at § 11134.
55. Id. at § 11133.
56. Id.
57. Id. at § 11131.
58. Id.
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State Medical Boards, in turn, are required to forward disci-
plinary information to a national database.59
Conditioning immunity on reporting requirements also
addresses the difficulty of tracing physicians who frequently
move to escape a history of incompetence.60 When faced with
a physician suspected of incompetence, some hospitals may
have requested a physician's resignation rather than initiating
formal review procedures.61 In this way the offending hospi-
tal would protect its reputation, its patients, and the immedi-
ate community while the physician, armed with a clean em-
ployment record, was free to practice elsewhere. Under the
new law, hospitals or reviewing boards failing to report re-
view actions would lose their immunity from liability. 2 Im-
munity for reviewing physicians is necessary because the com-
prehensive reporting system places a premium on disciplinary
activities. Because the results of most review proceedings will
no longer be easily hidden or avoided, the physician in ques-
tion might resort to litigation to challenge an unfavorable re-
view action. 3
To complement the effectiveness of the reporting re-
quirements, hospitals are required to examine the record of
each physician applying for clinical privileges and to review
biannually the records for those already on staff." If this in-
formation is not obtained, the hospital is presumed to have
actual knowledge of that physician's background65 and may
face liability for the physician's actions.
The 1986 Act remedies one of the major weaknesses of
the self-regulation by the medical profession. Under the
grant of immunity, local and state review boards following
proper procedures may conduct stringent investigation with-
out fear of retaliatory litigation or liability for damages. In
addition to protecting the activities of review boards, the re-
porting requirements of the Act help coordinate disciplinary
efforts. While the system of self-regulation still suffers inher-
ent limitations, these reforms should help tighten profes-
sional regulation and thereby improve the quality of health
care. By reducing the amount of injury and death caused by
incompetent physicians, the Health Care Quality Improve-
59. Id. at §§ 11132, 11133.
60. H.R. Rep. No. 903, 99th Cong. 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1986).
61. Ritter, supra note 34.
62. Health Act of 1986, supra at note 44, at § 11111.
63. H.R. Rep. No. 903, supra note 60, at 3.
64. Health Act of 1986, supra at note 44, § 11135.
65. Id.
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ment Act should also aid cost containment efforts.
B. The Harvard Standards for Anesthesia Monitoring
The Harvard Medical School standards for continuous
monitoring during the administration of anesthesia focus on
a central issue in medicine, that of preventing error as a
means to reduce the incidence and costs of malpractice.66
The standards for anesthesia practice resulted from a study
of the nine university hospitals affiliated with the Harvard
Medical School. A risk management group reviewed eight
years of anesthesia-related insurance claims from these hospi-
tals and found the majority of cases involving serious injury
or death to the patient were preventable.6 The committee
concluded "more meticulous monitoring of the patients
would help prevent such anaesthesia accidents."6
The promulgation of the Harvard standards represents a
major shift for the practice of anesthesiology and for the
medical profession.69 During their study controversy devel-
oped about whether to offer broad guidelines for care or de-
tailed, mandatory standards of practice, for "only vague or
general standards of practice exist in American medicine."7
Although "specific standards for the minute-to-minute con-
duct of anesthesia practice have never before been promul-
gated,"'7 1 they concluded "[blasic monitoring practices were
thought to be so important in accident prevention that they
must be mandatory. "72
The Harvard standards are offered as a precedent for all
practitioners. 3 It is widely accepted, however, that the level
of expertise and patient care is higher in university hospitals
than in community hospitals. This difference among teaching
practice and local medical practice is reflected by two signifi-
cant omissions: the standards fail to address the wide varia-
tion in training among nurse-anesthetists and the standards
fail to recognize the economic conflict of interest arising
from the use of attenuated care.
66. Harvard Anesthesia Standards, supra note 3.
67. Id. at 1017.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1018.
72. Id. at 1017.
73. Id. at 1018.
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In current anesthesia practice, an anesthesiologist, a phy-
sician with additional training or board specialization in anes-
thesia, bears primary responsibility for patient care. While
the anesthesiologist might personally attend the patient
throughout the administration, a nurse-anesthetist, a regis-
tered nurse with additional training in anesthesia, may assist
the anesthesiologist. Often times, as illustrated by the Schnei-
der and Worthy cases, the anesthesiologist selects the proper
anesthetic agent and the means of administration but is not
present during surgery. The nurse-anesthetist, acting under
the anesthesiologist's authority, administers the anesthesia,
monitors the patient, and supervises the patient's recovery.
While this method of practice is widely-used, efficient, and
normally presents few technical difficulties, this attenuated
care system raises several troubling questions.
The goal of this supervisory system is to provide accept-
able patient care in a cost-efficient manner. The role of the
nurse-anesthetist in an attenuated care system, however, lacks
certainty. While the anesthesiologist bears primary responsi-
bility for patient care, the degree of independent judgment
exercised by individual nurse-anesthetists remains unclear. As
illustrated by the JCAH standards for anesthesiologists and
nurse-anesthetists, 7 4 their duties and responsibilities overlap
to a great extent. Both anesthesiologists and anesthetists may
select the proper anesthesia and procedures for administra-
tion, induce anesthesia, and manage the patient throughout
the procedure."
Because of lack of uniformity in training, the ability of
different nurse-anesthetists to exercise judgment and fulfill
this role is unclear. 7' A nurse-anesthetist is defined as a regis-
tered nurse with additional training in the administration of
anesthesia.7 A registered nurse may have from two to four
years of training, and anesthesia training programs vary in
length from six months to two years. Thus a nurse-anesthetist
with two and one-half years of training may be performing
essentially the same duties as an anesthetist with six years of
education and training." Although some nurse-anesthetists
74. Peters, supra note 16, at 214.
75. Id.
76. Interview with Ms. C. Kil Gillis, BSN, former instructor of nurs-
ing, Memorial Hospital, South Bend, IN and law student, Notre Dame Law
School, in South Bend (Feb. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Kil Gillis]. Telephone
interview with Ms. L. Dykhouse, Registered Nurse (Feb. 11, 1987).
77. Kil Gillis, supra note 76.
78. Id.
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could exercise a substantial degree of professional judgment,
others require much closer supervision. While the practice of
attenuated care depends heavily on the abilities of the indi-
vidual anesthetist, the competency and quality of care pro-
vided by nurse-anesthetists as a class may vary widely. Al-
though standards relating to technical aspects of practice may
reduce technical error, "inexperienced personnel and inade-
quate monitoring"" are problems of training and staffing,
not primarily technical problems.
The foremost concern raised by the practice of attenu-
ated anesthetic care involves a conflict between patient care
and economic considerations. Although proper patient care
should be the primary consideration, recent studies of anes-
thetic malpractice claims prove current anesthetic practices
are not wholly effective."0 One study of anesthetic mishaps
concluded "[a]lleged negligence during anesthesia was found
to be due, in part, to inexperienced personnel and inade-
quate monitoring, often because a supervising anesthesiolo-
gist had too heavy a case load."8 " While supervising several
nurse-anesthetists, each working in a different operating
room, the anesthesiologist might still meet the duty of care
prescribed by the profession and advocated by the Harvard
standards. This method of practice might reduce the cost of
each administration of anesthesia, but use of an attenuated
care system also provides an economic reward to the anesthe-
siologist. Anesthesiologists might well earn much more
money by loosely supervising several nurse-anesthetists than
by monitoring each anesthesia personally. Providing attenu-
ated supervisory care may be adequate in most instances, but
this is simply not providing optimal care. If an emergency
arises during the administration of anesthesia, the anesthesi-
ologist should be available immediately to offer the expertise
needed to prevent patient injury or death. The nurse-anes-
thetist, because of a lesser degree of training, may be ill-pre-
pared to deal with such a situation. Because of the possibility
of such emergencies, use of an attenuated care system is ques-
tionable at best. Efforts to contain costs and provide nor-
mally-adequate patient care should not be used to justify a
lack of proper care in a small number of emergencies. Should
79. Peters, supra note 16, at 5, (quoting Hirsch and White, The Patho-
logic Anatomy of Medical Malpractice Claims, 6 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC-
TICE 26-28 (1978)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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the anesthesiologist forgo a lucrative method of practice to
ensure patient safety? Close supervision of anesthetists or di-
rect involvement by the anesthesiologist are more defensible
means of practice, for these methods increase the level of pa-
tient care.
While acceptance of the Harvard standards might pro-
duce uniformity in the quality of anesthetic care, the promul-
gation and use of standards raises additional questions. The
process of formulating standards is itself subject to inherent
limitations. The Harvard standards are based on eight years
of data, ending in 1984.82 Given the rapid development of
medical knowledge and technology, standards may easily be-
come dated, even only a few years after introduction. To be
sure, the authors of the Harvard study call for timely revi-
sion. 8 While standards may provide firm basis for a minimal
level of care, this level is only relevant for a comparatively
short term, for as long as the standards are current and up-
dated. It should be recognized, however, that this minimal
level of care, by the nature of standards, will perennially be
several years behind the level of present technology and
practices.
A second functional weakness for standards involves the
nature of standards. As the authors admit, they struggled
with the question of trying to "codify current practice and
validate the existing, declare an ideal that may be impossibly
high, or strike a balance in between [current practice and the
ideal practice]."" While the Harvard group opted to strike a
balance between existing practice and an ideal practice, any
other segment of the medical profession seeking to codify its
practices must address the same difficulty. Although the stan-
dards proposed by the Harvard group are the first of their
kind, the authors declare this "model is valid for all of Amer-
ican medicine." 86 Another group following this model might
choose only to codify existing practices. While such weak
standards might be readily accepted, they would have little
practical validity.8 6 If standards are perceived as signifying ef-
fective self-regulation, widespread adoption of standards
could produce a masking effect. Those areas of medicine with
standards in force would be seen as taking effective measures
82. Harvard Anesthesia Standards, supra note 3, at 1017.
83. Id. at 1020.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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to ensure quality, regardless of the efficacy of their respective
standards.
The setting of standards for anesthesia monitoring
should improve the minimal level of care within the specialty
and reduce malpractice. By failing to address non-technical
areas such as the use of attenuated care, however, the stan-
dards ignore significant weaknesses within anesthesiology.
IV. ETHICAL CONCERNS FOR PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION
AND ANESTHESIOLOGY
Concern for the quality of care provided with an attenu-
ated care system in anesthesiology reflects a broader issue
facing the medical profession. Professional self-regulation is
based in part on effective formal controls such as review
boards. Reliance solely on formal disciplinary measures is
misguided, however, for professional self-regulation is pri-
marily based on individual discipline and individual morality.
Such measures as the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
should increase the effectiveness of formal self-regulation and
peer review. Better use of these methods of discipline should
produce a minimally adequate level of care. The fundamental
questions of professional self-regulation, however, are ethical.
How might physicians be encouraged to go beyond the mini-
mum standard to provide a greater level of care?
The level of care a physician should provide can be ex-
plained by postulating a continuum of professional behavior.
On one extreme, a physician's performance might be incom-
petent or negligent; on the opposite extreme, the physician
could provide care approaching the outer limit of medical
knowledge and expertise. Between these two extremes of per-
formance lies an area of acceptable professional conduct
ranging from providing minimally adequate care to providing
optimal care, the level of care generally available in the
health care system.
This range of acceptable conduct can be expressed in
terms of Lon Fuller's distinction between the morality of
duty and the morality of aspiration. The morality of duty
prescribes what is simply necessary for mere achievement. In
contrast, the morality of aspiration sets forth "a rather gen-
eral idea of the perfection we ought to aim at" while not "af-
ford[ing] us any certain and infallible directions of acquiring
87. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (1964).
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it."" Using Fuller's terminology, a physician has a morality
of duty to perform at least at a minimally adequate level.
This is consistent with the physician's legal duty to provide
competent care, as determined by the standard of ordinary
and reasonable care. Beyond this mere legal duty, however,
the physician also has a moral responsibility to provide an op-
timal level of care. This moral imperative to provide a gener-
ally attainable level of care corresponds with Fuller's morality
of aspiration.
The range of acceptable professional conduct within an-
esthesiology should also be defined using the morality of duty
and the morality of aspiration. The morality of duty, of pro-
viding an adequate level of care, is or should be set by hospi-
tal review boards and state medical boards. The Harvard
Standards for anesthesia monitoring would simply refine this
process by mandating specific practices and a specific level of
care required of nurse-anesthetists and anesthesiologists. The
morality of aspiration for the practice of anesthesiology is not
defined by a set of standards or guidelines. The anesthesiolo-
gist should surpass mere competency and strive to provide
the best care readily available in the health care system.
The level of human error in current anesthesiology prac-
tice fails to meet the range of acceptable professional conduct
as defined by the morality of duty and the morality of aspira-
tion. In most administrations of anesthesia under the current
system of attenuated care, the minimally required level of
care is sufficient to avoid patient injury. Studies suggest, how-
ever, that up to one-half of current anesthetic mishaps are
caused by improper monitoring." This level of human error
is not morally defensible. It is not immoral that mistakes are
committed, for a bad outcome in itself does not involve mo-
rality. Attenuated care is not flawed merely because of the
rate of anesthetic mishaps. Under the attenuated care system,
however, patient injury or death occurs because of human er-
ror, and these errors could have been avoided if anesthesiolo-
gists were nearer to hand. The attenuated care system is not
flawed because a significant portion of these mishaps could,
and should, be prevented.
The ethical shortcomings of the attenuated care system
become most acute when preventable human errors are ac-
cepted simply because use of attenuated care is efficient -
efficient both in containing the cost of each administration of
88. Id. at 6.
89. Pierce, Risk Modification, supra note 6 at 25.
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anesthesia and in producing an economic benefit to the
anesthesiologist.
The attenuated care system provides adequate care
under normal circumstances and allows for the efficient dis-
tribution of anesthetic services. Efficiency alone', however,
cannot justify the level of adverse outcomes in current anes-
thesia practice. The quality of care and additional increment
of patient safety from increased monitoring should not be
sacrificed for cost containment. This is not to postulate that
to save a life any expense is always justified. Proper monitor-
ing during anesthesia is not a heroic effort to prolong life or
to avoid an inevitable death, but to prevent human error.
Moreover, the nature and resultant expense of anesthetic
mishaps may well turn the cost-containment argument on its
head. Improving the level of monitoring during anesthesia,
either by increasing the use of instruments or by closer super-
vision by the anesthesiologist, might well be less expensive
than the costs of medical insurance and of awards for patient
injuries and deaths. It is not a question of how the profession
might afford closer supervision, but how anesthesiologists can
afford not to provide closer supervision and better monitor-
ing during anesthesia.
Anesthesiologists, both as individual practitioners and as
members of the profession, should also address the ethical
tension between economic gain and patient care inherent in
an attenuated care system. The use of an attenuated care sys-
tem in anesthesiology may emphasize economic security at
the expense of patient safety. Loose supervision of a number
of nurse-anesthetists may produce efficiency and economic
gain, yet this method of practice might also lead to cata-
strophic results in a small percentage of cases. Close supervi-
sion of anesthesia administrations, either by utilizing fewer
nurse-anesthetists or by increasing direct involvement by the
anesthesiologist, should produce better care by reducing
human error and the incidence of malpractice. Close supervi-
sion, however, may increase the cost of administration while
reducing anesthesiologists' incomes. A central question facing
anesthesiology and the larger profession does not involve
technical expertise or cost efficiency, but ethics: how "does
the profession organize itself in such a way as to prevent the
practitioner's natural concern with his own economic security
and advancement from dominating his ethical concern with
the good of his clientele?"9 In an acceptable form of profes-
90. Friedson, supra note 30, at 362.
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sional organization the tension between economic security
and patient care would be minimized, if it even existed. Pri-
macy must be placed on professional responsibility - to care
for patients - while worries of income levels should receive
secondary or tertiary consideration.
Impetus for a renewed sense of professional responsibil-
ity should come from at least four different areas. First, the
American Society of Anesthesiologists ("ASA") should en-
courage changes in the profession designed to improve pa-
tient care. For example, the ASA has formally adopted stan-
dards for anesthesia monitoring similar to those proposed by
the Harvard study.91 The ASA has also attempted to define
the proper functioning of the attenuated care system. As
stated in the ASA Guidelines for the Ethical Practice of
Anesthesiology:
The Society recognizes that the personal provision of anes-
thesia care by the anesthesiologist must remain a desirable
primary goal. It also believes that a proper concern for its
members is the establishment of an acceptable environment
within which medical direction of the anesthesia care team
may be carried out so as to provide better anesthesia care
for more patients."
While the ASA has also defined "medical direction"93
within these guidelines as a method of providing proper pa-
91. The ASA standards for anesthesia monitoring are set forth in
Appendix B. Although similar to the standards promulgated by the
Harvard Medical School, these are not as comprehensive. In addition, the
ASA standards suffer from the same weaknesses and limitations as the
Harvard standards, as discussed. AM. SOC'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, STAN-
DARDS FOR BASIC INTRA-OPERATIVE MONITORING (amended Oct. 21, 1986).
92. AM. Soc'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR THE ETHICAL
PRACTICE OF ANESTHESIOLOGY (amended Oct. 14, 1987) [hereinafter ASA
Guidelines for Ethical Practice].
93. The ASA defines medical direction as:
Anesthesia direction, management or instruction provided by an
anesthesiologist whose responsibilities include:
a. Pre-anesthetic evaluation of the patient.
b. Prescription of the anesthesia plan.
c. Personal participation in the most demanding procedures in
this plan, especially those of induction and emergence.
d. Following the course of anesthesia administration at frequent
intervals.
e. Remaining physically available for the immediate diagnosis
and treatment of emergencies.
f. Providing indicated post-anesthesia care.
An anesthesiologist engaged in medical direction should not per-
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tient care, establishing an "acceptable environment" for
medical care has not been addressed. Instead, the ASA has
failed to recognize the economic implications of the attenu-
ated care system. In its statement of policy, the ASA asserts,
"It is the official policy of The American Society of Anesthe-
siologists, Inc. that an anesthesiologist is free to choose
whatever arrangement he prefers for compensation of his
professional services. The Society does not consider the com-
pensation arrangement so chosen to be a matter of profes-
sional ethics." 9
4
The attenuated care system in anesthesiology is not only
an efficient method of providing anesthesia services, it is also
a lucrative compensation arrangement. When patient care is
compromised because of the professional's compensation ar-
rangement, as it is in a small number of cases with attenuated
care, this should certainly be a matter of professional ethics.
The ASA should do more than suggest that "personal provi-
sion of anesthesia care" is a "desirable primary goal."' 95 Mea-
sures to improve patient monitoring and care need be taken.
For example, the ASA has officially supported programs to
"provide accredited educational programs and national cre-
dentials for Respiratory Therapists."96 The ASA, however,
has not taken a similar position to establish uniform educa-
tional requirements for nurse-anesthetists. Rather than
merely ratifying the existing practices and arrangements
within the profession, the ASA should take the lead in im-
proving patient care.
Second, both hospitals and insurers should also provide
incentives to improve the level of patient care during the ad-
ministration of anesthesia. In an age of medical parsimony,
however, it must be recognized that the most powerful ra-
tionale for making changes will be that of economic effi-
ciency. Use of an attenuated care system may be attractive
initially, for it offers efficient use of professional resources
while reducing the cost of each administration of anesthesia.
sonally be administering another anesthetic, and should use sound
judgement [sic] in initiating other concurrent anesthetic and emer-
gency procedures.
ASA Guidelines for Ethical Practice, supra note 98.
94. AM. SOC'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, STATEMENT OF POLICY (amended
Oct. 14, 1987).
95. ASA Guidelines for Ethical Practice, supra note 98.
96. AM. Soc'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, STATEMENT REGARDING RESPIRA-
TORY THERAPY LICENSURE (amended Oct. 16, 1985).
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When considering the enormous cost of each error involving
anesthesia, however, it may well be less expensive overall to
shoulder the added costs of increased supervision. 7 Until it is
established that closer supervision of anesthesia is truly cost-
effective, neither hospitals nor insurers can be expected to
support changes in the established system of care.
Third, medical schools and teaching hospitals should
continue to seek improved methods of care. Despite its short-
comings, the study which formulated the Harvard standards
was commendable. If the attempt to contain medical costs by
improving patient care "is valid for all of American
medicine,""8 the results of these efforts should be equally
instructive.
Fourth, the profession and the ASA is composed of indi-
vidual anesthesiologists. Each should examine carefully their
current methods of practice and decide whether these pro-
vide an acceptable margin of safety for each of their patients.
The individual practitioner, above all, must choose whether
to place primacy on professional responsibility or on eco-
nomic security and advancement. This choice may also be ex-
pressed by the morality of duty and the morality of aspira-
tion: the professional might choose only to meet the
minimally required level of care, and choose to be content
with professional mediocrity; or the professional may follow
an aspiration, striving to provide each patient with the best
care available. At its fundamental level this choice turns on
trust. Since no amount of formal or informal regulation of
the professional can transform a simple duty into the requi-
site aspiration, society and each patient must trust the profes-
sional to make the proper decision.
CONCLUSION
As witnessed by studies of the specialty of anesthesiology,
improvements are needed in current anesthetic practices.
While both formal and informal methods of professional self
regulation help to define a minimally acceptable standard of
97. For example, a study by the St. Paul Insurance Company found
twenty-three percent of anesthesia claims were for catastrophic incidents,
each of which cost an average of $131, 459. See supra note 10. Similarly,
the authors of the Harvard Anesthesia Standards cite an estimate that an-
esthesia malpractice settlements and awards average over $100,000 and
range up to $41 million. Harvard Anesthesia Standards, supra note 3, at
1017 (quoting United Press Int'l, Sept. 27, 1984).
98. Harvard Anesthesia Standards, supra note 3, at 1020.
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care for the medical profession, these attempts at regulation
suffer shortcomings. By increasing the effectiveness of peer
review, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act should
strengthen self-regulation and refine the level of acceptable
care.
The Harvard Anesthesia Standards represent one of the
first attempts to establish mandatory standards of medical
care. Reliance on these standards and on similar standards
adopted by the ASA should improve the level of patient care
in anesthesiology. The standards fail to address, however,
two problems in the attenuated care system: the training of
nurse-anesthetists and the conflict between economic consid-
erations and patient care. Uniformity in the education and
utilization of nurse-anesthetists should increase the level of
current monitoring, thereby reducing the current rate of an-
esthetic error. The tension between patient care and com-
pensation arrangements inherent in the attenuated care sys-
tem can be resolved only by re-emphasizing professional
responsibility. Whether undertaken to contain costs or to im-
prove the profit margins of insurers, hospitals, or physicians,
the relentless search for efficiency in medicine should not be
allowed to encroach upon the quality of patient care.
[Vol. 3
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Appendix A
HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL STANDARDS FOR PATIENT MONI-
TORING DURING ANESTHESIA
These standards apply for any administration of anes-
thesia involving department of anaesthesia personnel and are
specifically referable to preplanned anesthetics administered
in designated anesthetizing locations (specific exclusion: ad-
ministration of epidural analgesia for labor or pain manage-
ment). In emergency circumstances in any location, immedi-
ate life support measures of whatever appropriate nature
come first with attention turning to the measures described
in these standards as soon as possible and practical. These are
minimal standards that may be exceeded at any time based
on the judgment of the involved anesthesia personnel. These
standards encourage high-quality patient care, but observing
them cannot guarantee any specific patient outcome. These
standards are subject to revision from time to time, as war-
ranted by the evolution of technology and practice.
ANESTHESIOLOGIST'S OR NURSE-ANESTHETIST'S PRESENCE IN OP-
ERATING ROOM
For all anesthetics initiated by or involving a member of
the department of anesthesia, an attending or resident anes-
thesiologist or nurse-anesthetist shall be present in the room
throughout the conduct of all general anesthetics, regional
anesthetics, and monitored intravenous anesthetics. An ex-
ception is made when there is a direct known hazard, e.g.,
radiation, to the anesthesiologist or nurse-anesthetist, in
which case some provision for monitoring the patient must
be made.
BLOOD PRESSURE AND HEART RATE
Every patient receiving general anesthesia, regional anes-
thesia, or managed intravenous anesthesia shall have arterial
blood pressure and heart rate measured at least every five
minutes, where not clinically impracticable.*
ELECTROCARDIOGRAM
Every patient shall have the electrocardiogram continu-
ously displayed from the induction or institution of anesthesia
* Under extenuating circumstances, the attending anesthesiologist
may waive this requirement after so stating (including reasons) in a note in
the patient's chart.
19881
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
until preparing to leave the anesthetizing location, where not
clinically impracticable.
CONTINUOUS MONITORING
During every administration of general anesthesia, the
anesthetist shall employ methods of continuously monitoring
the patient's ventilation and circulation. The methods shall
include, for ventilation and circulation each, at least one of
the following or the equivalent.**
For Ventilation.-Palpation or observation of the reser-
voir breathing bag, auscultation of breath sounds, monitoring
of respiratory gases such as end-tidal carbon dioxide, or mon-
itoring of expiratory gas flow. Monitoring end-tidal carbon
dioxide is an emerging standard and is strongly preferred.
For Circulation.- Palpation of a pulse, auscultation of
heart sounds, monitoring of a tracing of intra-arterial pres-
sure, pulse plethysmography/oximetry, or ultrasound periph-
eral pulse monitoring.
It is recognized that brief interruptions of the continuous
monitoring may be unavoidable.
BREATH SYSTEM DISCONNECTION MONITORING
When ventilation is controlled by an automatic mechani-
cal ventilator, there shall be in continuous use a device that is
capable of detecting disconnection of any component of the
breathing system. The device must give an audible signal
when its alarm threshold is exceeded. (It is recognized that
there are certain rare or unusual circumstances in which such
a device may fail to detect a disconnection.)
During every administration of general anesthesia using
an anesthesia machine, the concentration of oxygen in the
patient breathing system will be measured by a functioning
oxygen analyzer with a low concentration limit alarm in use.
This device must conform to the American National Stan-
dards Institute No.Z.79.10 standard.***
ABILITY TO MEASURE TEMPERATURE
During every administration of general anesthesia, there
shall be readily available a means to measure the patient's
** Equivalence is to be defined by the chief of the individual hospital
department after submission to and review by the department heads, De-
partment of Anaesthesia, Harvard Medical School, Boston.
*** Under extenuating circumstances, the attending anesthesiologist
may waive this requirement after so stating (including reasons) in a note in
the patient's chart.
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temperature. Rationale.-A means of temperature measure-
ment must be available as a potential aid in the diagnosis and
treatment of suspected or actual intraoperative hypothermia
and malignant hyperthermia. The measurement/monitoring
of temperature during every general anesthetic is not specifi-
cally mandated because the potential risks of such monitoring
and because of the likelihood of other physical signs giving
earlier indication of the development of malignant
hyperthermia.
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Appendix B
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGY STANDARDS FOR BASIC
INTRA-OPERATIVE MONITORING (APPROVED BY HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES ON OCTOBER 21, 1986)
These standards apply to all anesthesia care although, in
emergency circumstances, appropriate life support measures
take precedence. These standards may be exceeded at any
time based on the judgement [sic] of the responsible anesthe-
siologist. They are intended to encourage high quality pa-
tient care, but observing them cannot guarantee any specific
patient outcome. They are subject to revision from time to
time, as warranted by the evolution of technology and prac-
tice. This set of standards addresses only the issue of basic
intra-operative monitoring, which is one component of anes-
thesia care. In certain rare or unusual circumstances, 1) some
of these methods of monitoring may be clinically impractical,
and 2) appropriate use of the described monitoring methods
may fail to detect untoward clinical developments. Brief in-
terruptions of continual* monitoring may be unavoidable.
Under extenuating circumstances, the responsible anesthesiologist
may waive the requirement marked with an asterisk (*); it is recom-
mended that when this is done, it should be so stated, (including the
reason) in a note in the patient's medical record. These standards
are not intended for application to the care of the obstetrical
patient in labor or in the conduct of pain management.
STANDARD I
Qualified anesthesia personnel shall be present in the
room throughout the conduct of all general anesthetics, re-
gional anesthetics and monitored anesthesia care.
OBJECTIVE
Because of the rapid changes in patient status during an-
esthesia, qualified anesthesia personnel shall be continu-
ously present to monitor the patient and provide anes-
thesia care. In the event there is a direct known hazard,
e.g., radiation, to the anesthesia personnel which might
require intermittent remote observation of the patient,
some provision for monitoring the patient must be made.
In the event that an emergency requires the temporary
* Note that "continual" is defined as "repeated regularly and fre-
quently in steady rapid succession" whereas "continuous" means "pro-
longed without any interruption at any time."
[Vol. 3
PREVENTING MALPRACTICE
absence of the person primarily responsible for the anes-
thetic, the best judgement [sic] of the anesthesiologist
will be exercised in comparing the emergency with the
anesthetized patient's condition and in the selection of
the person left responsible for the anesthetic during the
temporary absence.
STANDARD II
During all anesthetics, the patient's oxygenation, ventila-
tion, circulation and temperature shall be continually
evaluated.
OXYGENATION
OBJECTIVE
To ensure adequate oxygen concentration in the in-
spired gas and the blood during all anesthetics.
METHODS
1) Inspired gas: During every administration of general
anesthesia using an anesthesia machine, the concen-
tration of oxygen in the patient breathing system
shall be measured by an oxygen analyzer with a low
oxygen concentration limit alarm in use.*
2) Blood oxygenation: During all anesthetics, adequate
illumination and exposure of the patient is necessary
to assess color. While this and other qualitative
clinical signs may be adequate, there are quantitative
methods, such as pulse oximetry, which are
encouraged.
VENTILATION
OBJECTIVE
To ensure adequate ventilation of the patient during all
anesthetics.
METHODS
1) Every patient receiving general anesthesia shall have
the adequacy of ventilation continually evaluated.
While qualitative clinical signs such as chest excur-
sion, observation of the reservoir breathing bag and
auscultation of breath sounds may be adequate,
quantitative monitoring of the Co2* content and/or
volume of expired gas is encouraged.
2) When an endotracheal tube is inserted, its correct
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positioning in the trachea must be verified. Clinical
assessment is essential and end-tidal C02 analysis, in
use from the time of endotracheal tube placement, is
encouraged.
3) When ventilation is controlled by a mechanical venti-
lator, there shall be in continuous use a device that is
capable of detecting disconnection of components of
the breathing system. The device must give an audi-
ble signal when its alarm threshold is exceeded.
4) During regional anesthesia and monitored anesthesia
care, the adequacy of ventilation shall be evaluated,
at least, by continual observation of qualitative
clinical signs.
CIRCULATION
OBJECTIVE
To ensure the adequacy of the patient's circulatory func-
tion during all anesthetics.
METHODS
1) Every patient receiving anesthesia shall have the
electrocardiogram continuously displayed from the
beginning of anesthesia until preparing to leave the
anesthetizing location.*
2) Every patient receiving anesthesia shall have arterial
blood pressure and heart rate determined and evalu-
ated at least every five minutes.*
3) Every patient receiving general anesthesia shall have,
in addition to the above, circulatory function contin-
ually evaluated by at least one of the following: pal-
pation of a pulse, auscultation of heart sounds, moni-
toring of a tracing of intra-arterial pressure,
ultrasound peripheral pulse monitoring, or pulse
plethysmography or oximetry.
BODY TEMPERATURE
OBJECTIVE
To aid in the maintenance of appropriate body tempera-
ture during all anesthetics.
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METHODS
There shall be readily available a means to continuously
measure the patient's temperature. When changes in
body temperature are intended, anticipated or suspected,
the temperature shall be measured.

